University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

4-1-1984

Legal Aspects of the Latin American External Debt
and its Ramifications for the Development and
Integration of the Americas
Vera S. Skuhersky

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Recommended Citation
Vera S. Skuhersky, Legal Aspects of the Latin American External Debt and its Ramifications for the Development and Integration of the
Americas, 16 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 109 (1984)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol16/iss1/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami InterAmerican Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE LATIN
AMERICAN EXTERNAL DEBT AND ITS
RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF
THE AMERICAS

I.

109

INTRODUCTION

II. REASONS FOR THE EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS
A.

Illiquidity

110

B.

World Recession

111

C.

Interest Rates and Spreads

112

CURRENT SOLUTION

113

III. THE
IV.
V.

VI.

VII.
VIII.

110

THE THREAT OF DEFAULTS

115

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

117

ACTUAL DEFAULT

120

DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF THE AMERICAS

123

CONCLUSION

124
I.

INTRODUCTION

Latin America is currently in the throes of an external debt
crisis. The effects of this crisis reach far beyond the immediate
lenders and debtors involved. From the unemployed in industries
that can no longer sell their goods, to the Latin American children
who go hungry due to increased food costs, there are many people
throughout the world being hurt by the current situation. If the
parties fail to work out solutions to this crisis, the result may be
disastrous for the global economy, the world banking system, international relations and the development of Latin America.
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This comment will examine: 1) some historic aspects of lending to Latin American nations; 2) the reasons for the current external debt crisis; 3) current stop-gap solutions to the problem; 4) the
legal aspects of loan defaults; and 5) the legal, economic and political ramifications of the debt crisis for the development and integration of the Americas. Its primary focus will be on Latin American loans classified by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB)as external public debt.'
The legal issues cannot be understood apart from their historical and economic contexts. A grasp of this background information
is also essential for testing whether enforcement of existing loan
contracts in the present legal framework is viable.
II.

A.

REASONS FOR THE EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS

Illiquidity

Bank loans to the major borrowing countries in Latin America
increased at a rapid rate which accelerated further in the mid1970's. The expansion in lending to Latin America is evidenced by
the following figures (in millions of dollars):
1. The IDB defines external public debt as follows:
The external public debt includes all external debt with an original or extended maturity of
one year or more, repayable in foreign currency and contracted directly by public bodies or
by private entities with a guarantee of payment by any of the following public institutions:
1. Central government or its departments;
2. Political subdivisions such as states, provinces, departments or
municipalities;
3. Central bank;
4. Autonomous institutions (such as corporations, development banks, railways,
utilities, etc.) where
(a) the budget of the institution is subject to the approval of the government of
the reporting country; or where
(b) the government owns more than fifty percent of the voting stock or more
than half of the members of the Board of Directors are government representatives; or where
(c) in the case of default the state would become liable for the debt of the
institution.
Consequently, the following are not registered as public debt- obligations with a maturity of less than one year, loans contracted with option of repayment in local currency, private sector debt without the guarantee of the public sector, "purchase" and "repurchase"
operations with the International Monetary Fund, and "swap" transactions between central
banks. INTER-AMRIcAN Dzvz opMNT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGREss IN LATIN
AMERICA 380 (1983) [hereinafter cited as IDB (1983)].
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7,205

20,792
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37,123

49,094

59,094

77,432

96,852

121,847

146,171

160,071

181,1W

These loans provided money for purchases of goods and construction of new projects, as well as for the liquidity needed to service
the accumulating debts. In mid-1982, the ability of Latin American
nations to borrow freely in the Eurodollar market was sharply curtailed in response to Mexico's near default. For example, during
the first half of 1982, Brazil's borrowing averaged $1.5 billion a
month. This amount was cut in half after the Mexican default, and
by the fourth quarter of 1982, the prior availability of automatic
borrowing had disappeared. By October 1982, Brazil had lost about
$4 billion in interbank deposits and approximately $2 billion in
trade-related lines of credit.8
The contraction of credit has caused severe liquidity problems.
It is one reason Latin American borrowers have confronted
problems in servicing their loans.4
B.

World Recession

Past borrowing appeared to be supportable in light of the conditions that existed when the loans were made.5 The borrowing
countries were experiencing a steady growth in GNP. The volume
of exports was increasing and brought in growing amounts of hard
currency to service the loans. Unfortunately, world economic conditions changed abruptly from expansion to recession.6 This resulted in a decline in the volume of exports.
In 1982, a steep drop in commodity prices caused export unit
values for goods from Latin America to drop by ten percent.7 The
drop in prices, coupled with the decline in volume, significantly reduced total export receipts. For example, Argentina's 1980 exports
of $7.82 billion fell to $3.4 billion in 1982 (56% decline); Brazil's
1980 exports of $10.60 billion fell to $8.06 billion in 1982 (24%
decline); Chile's 1981 exports of $3.54 billion fell to $2.01 billion in
1982 (43% decline); Mexico's 1981 exports of $24.91 billion fell to
2. IDB, supra note 1, at 381.

3. Langoni, The Way Out of the Country Debt Crisis, Oct. 1983 EuxosoNEy 20.
4. Bance, Brazil's O.K. - But The Others?, Nov. 1983 EUROMONsY 23.
5. Sandberg, Stop Breast-Beatingon LDC Debt, Oct. 1983 EutOMOYrf 34.
6. See IMF Survey, Sept. 5, 1983 at 261, col. 3.
7. IDB, Supra note 1, at 134. For example, sugar, which is exported by most Latin
American nations, suffered the most drastic drop in prices. From 1980 to 1982, the price per
metric ton dropped from $632 to $130. Id.
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'$16.56 billion in 1982 (44% decline); Peru's 1981 exports of $3.18
billion fell to $2.46 billion in 1982 (33% decline).' Thus, by 1982,
most Latin American nations had a severe shortage of hard currency from exports and had difficulty servicing their mounting
debts.
C. Interest Rates and Spreads
Most international bank loans have floating interest rates.
Euro-currency interest rates are usually based on the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)' for the currency of the loan. Other
Latin American loans are tied to the U.S. prime rate. Loan interest
rates are periodically adjusted to reflect changes in LIBOR or the
U.S. prime rate. The LIBOR and U.S. prime rate which were at 67% levels in 1976, rose to over 18% in mid-1981. 1° When most of
the loans were negotiated, interest rates were relatively low. In
some cases, they were actually negative in real terms when viewed
against the expanding economies. Due to the fiscal policies of the
United States, interest rates became unusually high, especially in
light of the world recession.
The high level of interest rates is the most significant cause of
the external debt crisis. Each 1% increase in the LIBOR increases
current account deficits by approximately $900 million in Brazil;
$300 million in Argentina; $150 million in Chile; $750 million in
Mexico; $90 million in Peru; and $350 million in Venezuela."
Borrowers also pay a premium or spread over LIBOR or the
U.S. prime rate. This spread is the basis of the bank's profit and is
negotiated in light of the relative risks involved. Since 1979, the
average spreads charged to developing nations increased from approximately .8% to over 1%, while spreads to developed nations
hovered around the .5% range.1 For the Latin American nations
with serious loan problems, the spreads are currently even higher,
ranging from 1 3 % to 2 3/s %. The higher spreads are also being
attached to loans that are being restructured, thus increasing the
burden.
8. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIREcTORY OF TRADE STATISTICS 4 (1983).

9. LIBOR is the interest rate on various currencies in the Euro-dollar Market that
London banks offer to other banks.
10. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND PROSPECTS

6, Occasional Paper 23 (1983). [hereinafter cited as IMF.]
11. Capitalism Under Stress, Oct. 1983 EUROMoNzY 64.
12. IMF supra note 9, at 6.
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The increase in spreads on new loans and renegoiated loans,
coupled with sharply increased interest rates, have caused loan service payments to rise at a faster rate than the total outstanding
principal of these loans."
From 1974 to 1981, annual service payments on the external
public debt increased in Argentina from $792 million to $2,150 million (272%); in Brazil from $1,219 million to $8,611 million
(706%); in Chile from $278 million to $1,662 million (597%); in
Mexico from $1,196 million to $8,482 million (709%) and in Venezuela from $506 million to $3,048 million (602 %). The total annual
service payments by Latin American countries rose from $5,564
million to $29,481 million (530%).14 Service payments have spiraled upward to the point where it is impossible to meet the payments with the amount of dollars available."'
The rapid growth of the servicing costs and the debt signifies
that greater percentages of new loans must be used to service existing loans instead of financing imports and development
projects. 16
III. THE CURRENT SOLUTION
In mid-1982, Mexico was on the brink of a major default that
would have produced significant economic, legal and political
repercussions throughout the world. To avert this crisis, and to
avoid subsequent defaults by other nations, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) formulated emergency credit programs that
enabled debtor nations to cope with the current illiquidity
problems. These IMF programs, however, are conditioned on
debtor nations agreeing to enact harsh economic austerity
measures.
In exchange for IMF assistance and loans, lender banks must
commit additional funds according to a quota system, which is
based on each bank's exposure in the debtor country. The additional loans are stop-gap measures that will hopefully hold off defaults until the debtors' ability to service their loans improves
markedly. Such improvement would result from a fall in interest
13. Bance, Brazil's O.K.-But the Others? Nov. 1983 Euaomomyv 23.
14. Id.
15. IBD, supra note 1, at 381.
16. Banks Must Acquire Equity in Debtor Countries, The Wail Street Journal, Sept.
30, 1983, at 31, col. 3.
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rates, an increase in the value of exports, or a decline in the value
of imports.
.As of late 1983, the IMF program, together with Mexico's selfimposed austerity measures have drastically improved Mexico's economic plight.The first half of 1983 produced a $6.5 billion trade
surplus; the government deficit was down 24% from the same period in 1982.17 However, in human terms, the price was high. Food
prices and unemployment shot up dramatically, causing hardships
for most Mexicans. ' 8
Brazil is experiencing the effects of the IMF measures. The
social costs have been tremendous. Food prices skyrocketed, wages
were reduced and employment fell as Brazil adopted austerity
measures to meet the IMF's conditions for new loans. Throughout
the fall of 1983, newspapers and magazines graphically documented strikes, food riots, supermarket looting and protests directly aimed at the IMF. 19 Some Brazilian supermarkets resorted
to the use of armed guards to prevent lootings from desperate
Brazilians caught in the economic "adjustments."2 0
To control resistance to the austerity programs, emergency
measures were enacted in Brazil on October 19, 1983, for 60 days,
and later rescinded. These measures included a ban on public discussions of the government's actions, arrests, house searches and
the government take-over of unions in Brasilia."
In an era when Brazil is being encouraged to promote democracy, this overreaction to the IMF conditions resulted in the loss of
IMF conditions resulted in the loss of recent gains and renewed
use of government repression."
The IMF measures can only attempt to remedy a debtor coun17. Robinson, The IMF vs. The People, Oct. 1983 EuiOMONEY 90, 93. Mexico voluntarily imposed additional corrective measures. Id.
18. Dolgar, Why Mexico Remains Poor, The Miami Herald, Sept. 25, 1983, at 1E,
col. 4.
19. Brooke, Economic Crisis Strains Brazil's Stability, The Miami Herald, Oct. 2,
1983, at 30A, col. 1.
20. Brooke, Brazils' Hunger Stalks Rio Slums as Mobs Fight Police to Loot Food, The
Miami Herald, Sept. 20, 1983, at 18A, col. 1.
21. Brazilian Emergency Measures, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1983 at 17,
col. 2.
22. Prior to this decree, Brazil was viewed on the "road back to democracy from military dictatorship". Ulman, Brazil's Rough Road Back to Democracy, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 1983 at 29, col. 4. But the emergency measures were seen as giving President
Figueiredo "near dictatorial powers in the capital district". Brazilian Decree Draws Protests, Miring Debt Plan, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 1983 at 33, col. 4.
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try's internal economic problems, while providing stop-gap funds
until the anticipated recovery. The major reasons for the current
situation are, however, external to the debtor nations and largely
outside of their control. Yet, Latin American nations must now
suffer the social and political consequences.
IV.

THE THREAT OF DEFAULTS

Loan defaults are the greatest threat to jeopardizing the precarious balance that currently exists amongst borrowers and lenders. Default is de facto when declared by borrowers, and can range
from suspension of principal and/or interest payments to formal
repudiation. Default is de jure when declared by creditors.23
The risk and occurrence of international loan defaults is not a
new situation. The most recent series of defaults by Latin American borrowers occurred in the 1930s due to the Great Depression24
However, the character of previous credit was different. Bonds
with fixed-interest rates were issued with banks merely serving as
underwriters and promoters. Therefore, the assets of the individual
investors were at risk, rather than the assets of banks. The individual creditors lacked bargaining power, so debtor countries in
financial trouble would usually suspend payments. nations would
attempt to give partial payment on the bonds when they tried to
get back into the bond markets." However, on several occasions,
bond defaults resulted in the extreme remedy of military
intervention.
After World War II, significant changes occurred in international lending. Today, banks are responsible for most of the loans.
Due to the strength and interrelationship of the banking system, as
well as the dependency of both developing and industrial nations
on international credit, the bank creditors now have greater negotiating strength than did individual bond holders. Due to the apparent reduction in risk, bank spreads are much lower than the risk
premiums bond purchasers previously demanded. However, a nation's payments on the bonds was predictable since the interest
23. R. Dale & R. Mattione, Managing Global Debt 2 (1983) (a staff paper from The
Brookings Institute) [hereinafter cited as Brookings.]
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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rates were fixed.2 7 Today's system of variable rate financing can
throw the best planning into disarray.
Banks also respond differently to financial difficulties. To prevent book losses, banks prefer to reschedule loan repayments in a
longer repayment time frame rather than accept a partial payment
of the debt. When this method is used during inflationary periods,
the banks benefit since the loans are renegotiated at current interest rates.2
In spite of the negotiating positions that banks have, write-offs
quietly occur on international loans, just as they do on domestic
loans. One hundred major U.S. banks reported that from 1975 to
1980 loans to debtors in Latin American countries were charged-off
in the following amounts: Venezuela - $17.4 million; Mexico - $57.9
million; Brazil - $31.0 million; Nicaragua - $34.6 million; Argentina - $17.2 million; Honduras $8.1 million; Guatemala - $7.5 million; Costa Rica - $7.2 million; Jamaica - $22 million; and El Salvador - $2.2 million.2 9 The majority of these loans were to private
parties and were written off the same way domestic loans to private parties are written off.
Charge-offs to Mexico and Nicaragua also included charge-offs
to the government-owned banks and agencies.3 0 For some of the
charged-off loans, banks may not have properly investigated
whether the debtors were actually part of the government that the
banks believed would ultimately be responsible for the loans. The
banks also may have failed to get third-party guarantees from the
governments. Where the write-offs were on loans to governments,
government agencies or government-owned banks, the amount of
the loans in jeopardy was dwarfed by the amount of outstanding
government placed loans the banks had in each country. Since external public loans are generally linked by cross-default agreements"' and guarantees by the central government on foreign
loans, a bank exposes all the external public debt of that country
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. A. Porzencanski, Profitabilityof International Banking, in International Banking,
139 (E. Roussakis ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as International Banking] citing Robert Morris Associates, Report on Domestic and InternationalLoan Charge-Offs (Philadelphia, various years).
30. Id.
31. A cross-default clause enables a lender to declare its loans to a country in default if
the country has defaulted on just one outstanding loan.
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to possible default by declaring a relatively small loan in default."2
Banking regulators would then require banks to increase loan loss
reserves or write-off the loans. 3 The survival of some major banks
would have been jeopardized due to the enormous sums of money
involved.
Apparently, the banks surveyed prefer to suffer small losses
rather than face the possible consequences of a large simultaneous
default of other loans. The potential problems with defaults
demonstrate that the negotiating position of international banks is
more precarious that generally realized.
V.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

When the legal posture of the banks in relation to their government debtors is examined, particular attention is focused on
the protection government debtors will receive under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a likely defense
whenever a creditor seeks a judgment against a government borrower or guarantor. Under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot be forced, without its consent, to answer in
the courts of another nation. In the United States, the Supreme
Court first followed this theory in The Schooner Exchange v. Mc3 4 In 1952, the absolute theory was officially rejected in the
Faddon.
"Tate" letter, which stated that the United States Department of
State would follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.35
Under the latter theory, sovereign immunity is recognized only
when a sovereign acts in a public capacity, but not when it acts in
a private or commercial capacity. The adoption of the restrictive
theory resulted from the recognition that governments have become more involved in commercial activities. Such activities are
beyond the scope of traditional governmental activities, and it is
viewed as unjust to deprive private parties, who deal commercially
with governments, a legal means of resolving disputes." Now, both
the United Kingdom and the United States have codified the re32. Porzencanski, supra, note 28.
33. Clarke & Farrar, Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated
Loans to Government Borrowers, 1978 V. ILL. L. REv. 229, 232 (1978).
34. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
35. 26 State Dept. Bulletin 984 (1952).
36. Nichols, Legal Issues in International Lending: General Consideration, International Banking supra note 28, at 155.
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strictive theory.37

An understanding of the sovereign immunity statutes in the
United States and United Kingdom is important because the majority of loans made to Latin America originate in these two countries. Since banks have had leverage in their negotiations, they
have insisted that their local laws apply and that debtors consent
to the creditor's jurisdiction." Some lenders from other countries
also require that the law of either the United States or the United
Kingdom apply since the legal systems and case law in these countries appear to be more predictable. This comment will now address on the treatment of sovereign immunity in the United States.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA) codified existing case law pertaining to sovereign immunity. The general rule is found in Section 1609 which states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the
property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune
from attachment arrest and execution
except as provided in sec39
tions 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.

Section 1611 (b)(1) recognizes that this immunity can be expressly waived. The section provides:
•(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from execution, if(1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account, unless such bank
or authority, or its parent foreign government, has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, notwithstanding any withdrawal
of the waiver which the bank, authority or government
may purport to
effect except in accordance with the terms
40
of the waiver.
The waiver of immunity exception is also found in section 1605
(a)(1) which states:
37. The State Immunity Act of 1978 is the statute in the United Kingdom. Id. at 168.
38. F. Nattier, Handling Disputes Outside The Inter-American and the United Nations Conventions, in Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America (S. Stairs,
ed. 1981).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (1976).
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(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver;'
Thus, if a proper waiver of immunity is attained from the foreign bank or the foreign government, as either debtor or guarantor,
and the dispute is governed by United States law, it is possible to
attach and execute on the central bank's assets held in the United
States. Most, if not all public loan agreements with Latin American countries contain such waivers, because they are highly recommended by the attorneys who draft the contracts for banks,"' and
because banks have occupied the dominant negotiating position.
The sovereign immunity protection of the FSIA applies only
to a government's non-commercial activities. Section 1605(a)(2)
states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States;"'
The foreign state has the burden of proving that it is entitled to
immunity because its claim does not fall within the § 1605(a)(2)
commercial exception."
Not only is immunity denied when the activity is commercial,
but also when the suit involves "rights in property taken in viola41. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
42. Nichols, supra note 23, at 159-160.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
44. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900, 903 (1981), [hereinafter cited as De Sanchez], citing HoUss JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, Doc. No. 94-1487, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & S. ADMIN. NPws 6604, 6615; Arango v. Guzman Travel
Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th Cir. 1980); Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial
Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 405 n.9 (D.N.J. 1979).
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tion of international law" 40 and
that property or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality
is engaged in a commercial
4
activity in the United States; 6
Under this section, a Nicaraguan citizen living in the United States
was able to recover $150,000 on a check that the central bank of
Nicaragua issued in her favor on its account in an American
bank. 47 The court acknowledged that the stop payment imposed on
the plaintiff's check in order to regulate foreign exchange controls
was a non-commercial government activity entitled to immunity.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff could still sue the bank for its noncommercial governmental activity because the central bank of Nicaragua conducted commercial activities in the United States.4
A foreign government's assets on deposit in the United States
are only entitled to immunity if: 1) the government has not waived
immunity in its contract; and, 2) the bank in which it deposits its
money does not engage in any commercial activity in the United
States. Hence, the FSIA actually offers little protection for a
debtor nation's assets on deposit in the United States.

VI. ACTUAL DEFAULT
The international media has focused much attention on the
external debt problems in Latin America and the dire potential of
default on the mounting debts. It is curious, therefore, that a recent suit involving such a default escaped much publicity by the
media and banking commentators. The case of Libra Bank Ltd. v.
Banco National de Costa Rica, S.A., involves Costa Rica's default
on a loan of forty million dollars. The court held that the assets of
the central bank of Costa Rica on deposit in the United States
could be attached. 9
The Libra Bank case presents a lengthy examination of the
45. See De Sanchez, 475 F. Supp. at 900.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976).
47. De Sanchez, 475 F. Supp. at 910.
48. Id.
49. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., No. 81-7624 slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Libra].
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legal issues involved in a suit to seize a central bank's assets in the
United States when a loan default occurs. In December 1980, a
consortium of sixteen banks80 loaned forty million dollars to the
Banco Nacional of Costa Rica, which is wholly-owned by the Costa
Rican government. This loan was to be completely repaid during
1981 in quarterly installments. The first installment was satisfied,
but after August 18, 1981, no further interest payments were made.
The Banco Nacional stated that it could not honor the re-payment
agreement and pay the second payment due August 30, 1983, because of a resolution of the Central Bank of Costa Rica. The resolution was adopted on August 27, 1981, only authorized foreign
currency repayments to multilateral agencies.
The Central Bank denied Banco Nacional's requests for foreign currency to pay the loan installment. In addition, on November 24, 1981, the President of Costa Rica and the Minister of Finance declared that the government and its public sector entities
could not pay interest or principal in foreign currencies on external
debts without official approvals. After the defendant defaulted, an
order of attachment was granted. The defendant's various bank accounts in New York were levied upon, and approximately $800,000
was attached. Months later, a United States Marshall was authorized to levy upon a number of additional banks. By this time, the
accounts of Banco Nacional were no longer maintained at these
banks or at any other banks in New York. At least two and half
million dollars had been withdrawn from the accounts.
The court reviewed the act of state doctrine noting that it "reflects at least in part the realization that in most cases there is
nothing an American court can do to rectify a foreign seizure
which has been fully effected within the territory of the expropriating state. .." The doctrine did not apply in this case because
the situs of the debt was New York and the New York court had
jurisdiction over it. Thus, the court held the loan agreement enforceable and the defendants liable for attorneys' fees under the
terms of the contract. Banco Nacional subsequently made an un50. Other plaintiffs were: Libra Bank Ltd. (agent for the sixteen banks), Libra International Bank S.A., Banco Espirito Santo e Commercial de Lisboa, Banco de Viscaya, S.A.,
Banque Internationale. A Luxembourg, S.A., Banque Rothschild, and The National Bank of
Washington and Banco de La Provencia de Buenos Aires (itself from a critically debtstrapped country).
51. Libra citing United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 874(2d
Cir. 1976), which cites Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F,2d 706,
715 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 398 U.S. 924 (1968).
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successful motion "to re-argue," based on Article VIII, Section 2(b)
of the Bretton Woods Agreement" claiming that this Agreement,
to which the United States and Costa Rica are signatories, overrode the act of state doctrine. Section 2(b) states that exchange
contracts are unenforceable. The court held that the loan agreement was not an exchange contract and, therefore, the Bretton
Woods Agreement was not applicable.5
Throughout the proceedings, Costa Rica acknowledged that it
owed the money on the loans and would eventually repay it. The
only problem was the country's shortage of foreign currency and its
self-preserving action of placing priorities on the use of its existing
foreign currency. The Libra Bank consortium was successful in
seizing a mere $800,000 and a judgment for the balance of the loan.
However, without assets to attach in the United States, the judgment left the plaintiffs in the same position as before the suit; they
would have to wait until Costa Rica was able to obtain the foreign
currency to repay the loan.
For problems concerning the Latin American external debt,
judgments granting attachments provide an unrealistic solution.
Due to the cross-default clauses on the loan agreements, all the
lending banks could be parties to a legal assault on the assets of a
Latin American nation that was declared to be in default. Due to
the economics of the situation, banks which could have declared
their loans to Costa Rica in default apparently did not do so. Libra
Bank attached what assets it could. Even if it had been successful
in attaching the $2.5 million that had been in the country's New
York accounts, this would still not have satisfied the amount due
on the loan.
Thus, the legal situation of the Latin American external debt
crisis is vastly different from that of previous attempts by one or
more claimants to attach the assets of a foreign sovereign. Since
hundreds of lending banks involved are intertwined by the crossdefault clauses in their loan contracts, it is possible that a declaration of default by one bank could result in a "crisis of confidence"
as well as rapid declarations of default by other banks on all their
loans. As a result of all the banks pressing their claims en masse
against limited and inadequate assets, each claimant would receive
52. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., No. 81-7624 slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1983).
53. Yd.
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too little to make legal recourse a viable solution.0
. Furthermore, if significant numbers of banks pressed their
claims against debtor nations and tried to attach their foreign currency assets, such actions would have grave political ramifications
and would affect the United States' economy and foreign policy.
All nations in difficulty would probably withdraw their assets held
in United States banks (or in the foreign banks that were subject
to attachment), due to fear for the safety of these assets. Such a
mass withdrawal would result in an unstable position for the
United States and the international banking system. The drastic
action of attaching what assets a country has would lead to political animosities by the affected country and its sympathizers since
the causes of the problem were mainly outside of the control of the
debtor nation, which had been acting in good faith.
This could ultimately result in intervention by the President
of the United States to resolve the situation. According to Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
213: "The President may waive or settle a claim against a foreign
state based on the responsibility of the foreign state for an injury
to a United States national, without the consent of such national." 0 This section was cited in the case of Dames & Moore v.
Regan," which upheld the power of the Executive branch to invalidate attachments.
VII. DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF THE AMERICAS
All of the countries of the Western Hemisphere have a vested
interest in the legal, economic, political, and social ramifications of
the external debt situation. Our nations are bound by the ties of
trade, monetary interdependence, immigration, and efforts for regional political stability.
When one nation suffers, the effects ripple to other nations.
54. As of August, 1983 banks in the United States reported liabilities payable in U.S.
dollars to the following countries: Argentina. $4,249 million; Brazil - $3,078 million; Chile $1,465 million; Colombia - $1,674 million; Cuba - $1,674 million; Ecuador - $12 million; Guatemala - $718 million; Jamaica - $106 million; Mexico - $9,444 million; Panama - $5,925
million; Peru - $1,127 million; Uruguay - $1,050 million; Venezuela -$8,575 million. Some of
this money is being held by individuals and other non-governmental entities and thus would
not be subject to attachment. FEDERAL RESERV BULLETIN OCT. 1983, ATA59-ASO.
55. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213

(1965).
56. 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981).
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Although the focus of the problem in the United States is on the
economic ramifications of a potential default on its banking system, other serious effects have already taken place. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York reported that a decline of exports to
Latin America cost the United States an estimated 250,000 jobs in
1982. United States exports to Latin America were $38.95 billion in
1981, $30.09 billion in 1982, and dropped to5 7$10.93 billion in the
first half of 1983 ($21.86 billion annualized).
The impact on Latin America is equally disturbing. Per capita
income has declined for the third straight year and is 8 % below its
peak in 1980.51 In more and more Latin American nations, increasing percentages of the GNP are being used solely to continue servicing the external debt. In the short term, it will be difficult for
these countries to develop economically at the previous pace unless
there is a significant increase in their exports and GNP to offset
these costs.
Due to the social pressures caused by the austerity measures
needed to cope with the situation, populist political pressures
could force Latin American governments to default on their loans.
Increased dictatorial control could result as the nations struggle to
force the measures on the population. The grave implications of
this situation demand the close scrutiny and cooperation of the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere, as well as the banking
community, since the costs of this problem affect nations as a
whole.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The external debt problem of Latin America is of enormous
political, social and economic importance to all of the Americas. It
also affects other parts of the world. The major causes of the debt
crisis are due to 1) illiquidity; 2) world recession and decreased exports; and 3) high interest rates and spreads. These factors are
mainly outside of the control of the affected debtor nations.
Legal proceedings declaring the existing loans in default and
attaching the hard currency assets that exist outside of the territory of the debtor nations are not a viable solution. Such judgments would be a hollow victory for the creditors, because the
57. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1983, at 33, col. 2.
58. Id. at col. 3.
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shortage of such assets would be inadequate to satisfy outstanding
debts. Creditors would be in a similar position to that of one who
holds a judgment against a judgment-proof debtor. These assets
are also vulnerable to withdrawal by debtor nations. Furthermore,
attachment proceedings would alienate the debtor nations from
the creditor nations both politically and economically.
Since the legal solution is inadequate and the problem deeply
troubles the nations involved, cooperation to remedy the situation
must transcend the immediate self-interests of those who are parties to the loans. Programs, such as those of the IMF, should be
supported, but always with sensitive evaluations of the social and
political ramifications on the nations that must conform to the
austerity measures. Nations in better economic positions must take
the responsibility of aiding those nations with debt problems by
contributing excess food and by facilitating trade. International cooperation, not legal confrontation, is the key to an effective resolution of this problem.
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